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chapter 3
“Fighting Over a Shadow?”: Hellenistic Greek
Cities and Greco-Roman Cities as Fora and
Media for Multi-Level Social Signaling
LuAnnWandsnider
Introduction
Historical accounts emphasize intra-individual competition among the cit-
izenry of Hellenistic cities and Greco-Roman cities of Anatolia.1 These and
other historical accounts emphasize the strife and rivalries occurring between
cities.2 Aelius Aristides labelled this intra-city strife a “madness,” representing
“fighting over a shadow” that annoyed the emperor.3 Subsequent analysis has
demonstrated, however, that these intra-city competitions were much more
substantial and consequential.4 In this chapter, I use signaling theory to link
rivalries at the citizen and city levels and explore the role played bymonumen-
tal civic architecture as employed by citizens and cities to communicate with
their rivals. Citizens signaled toother citizens their prosocial orientationaswell
as their oratorical ability and wealth with which they could act on this orienta-
tion. Cities signaled to their peers and superiors their pro-superior inclination
and their abilities to mount significant collective action.
This chapter presents signaling theory as a higher-level body of evolution-
ary theory that sees early urban formations, i.e., cities, as both the fora and
media for emergent complex social interactions, allowing both citizens and
cities to be differentially “successful.” I first introduce multi-level social signal-
ing and then attempt to argue for the public architecture seen in the Greek
cities of Hellenistic western Anatolia (third through first centuries bc) and
Greco-Roman cities of Roman Asia Minor (first through third centuries ad) as
a conjoined costly signal emitted by both citizen and city. Finally, I reexam-
ine several propositions about the complex social interactions in these cities,
1 E.g., Greek and Roman overview in Veyne 1976; see also Price 1984.
2 Gleason 2006; Mitchell 1993.
3 Aelius Aristides, Oration 23.59, 62–64.
4 Burrell 2004; Millar 1993.
Published in URBAN DREAMS AND REALITIES IN ANTIQUITY: REMAINS AND 
REPRESENTATIONS OF THE ANCIENT CITY, edited by Adam M. Kemezis  
(Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2015), pp. 69-98.
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adding, I hope, to current efforts to construct a broader yet nuanced under-
standing of ancient cities.
Multi-Level Social Signaling
Signaling theory refers to a subset of Darwinian thinking that describes the
non-lethal communication that occurs between entities (i.e., individuals and
groups), with the communicative act itself linking observable and unobserv-
able traits. In the case of human actors, a material act communicates some
hidden aspect of an individual or group, and, with this signal, other discern-
ing entities (or receivers) can make decisions about whether to engage with,
ally with or avoid the signaler. Indeed, the allegiances and alliances constitute
one kind of acknowledgement of the signal quality by other individuals (in
the case of an individual signaler) or by other groups (in the case of a group
signaler). Decisions about with whom to ally have immediate consequences
for success in reproduction, production, and social production. Families make
decisions about whether to ally their families by marrying sons and daughters,
by agreeing to farm together, and by agreeing to defend their community, thus
affecting theirmutual survival.Within an evolutionary framework, a gooddeci-
sion is one that leads to success for allied senders and receivers, where success
is defined as persistence and perhaps even expansion. By definition, a bad deci-
sion may lead to familial or group extinction.
Anthropologists Bleige Bird and Smith (2005) reviewed signaling theory,
finding it useful for incorporating disparate concepts—Thorstein Veblen’s
(1994; first published 1899) notion of conspicuous consumption and Pierre
Bourdieu’s (1986) notion of social capital—into a single evolutionary frame-
work. By doing so, behaviors that at first glance seem to serve no functional
end and appear irrational now have a rational basis. In this way, social science
investigative tools can be brought to bear on the seemingly irrational.5
Fraser Neiman (1997) was the first to apply this approach in anthropology,
with his analysis of ClassicMayanpyramids and stelae6 as costly signals emitted
by lords and would-be lords. He argues that the so-called Maya collapse, that
is, the cessation of pyramid building and stelae erection seen in the Maya
5 Costly signaling, a flavor of signaling, was first discussed in the biological literature as the
handicap principle. See Grafen 1990, Zahavi 1975, Zahavi and Zahavi 1997. See Cronk 2004
and Higham 2014 for recent correctives. See also Smith and Bleige Bird 2000.
6 Stelae (singular stela) are intricately carved upright slabs of stone found bothwithin commu-
nities and at borders and used to project political messages, Borowicz 2002.
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heartland about ad 900, is best interpreted as a cessation in signaling as the
potential audience for these costly signals fled to areas where agricultural
potential had not been reduced by locally high rainfall levels. Signalers had too
few receivers to whom to send, he contends.
Shortly thereafter, James Boone (1998, 2000) focused analytic attention on
magnanimity, that is, generous community feasts sponsored by specific kin
groups, as another kind of costly signal. He argued that these constituted a
way for middle-range groups with dynamic kin groups (his examples came
from ethnographically known American Northwest Coast complex hunter-
gatherers and American Southwest agriculturalists) to build status. In turn,
this status was used to establish priority access to resources when times were
bad.7
Why the term, “costly signaling?” What is “costly” about a costly signal? In
Zahavi’s (1975) earliest conceptualization, the idea was that low cost signalers
emitting a high cost signal weremore handicapped than a high quality signaler
sending the same signal; this marginal cost ensured an honest signal, Zahavi
argued.
This initial conceptualization has not stood the test of time. More recent
analyses8 have recognized that Zahavi’s costly signals need not be honest. This
scholarship recognizes that some honest signals may simply index a scalar
quality of the signaler. In Neiman’s Mayan case, only an individual with the
skills, charisma, connections, and resources can actually put up a pyramid.
Pretenders would soon be exposed. Similarly, in Boone’s case, the feast is
an honest index of kin network size and organization. In addition, signals
passed between senders and receivers may expose the circumstances under
which their interests are aligned or misaligned, as seen in the intra-citizen and
intra-city analyses below.
For the purposes of this discussion, I focus on costly ‘indexical’ signals; that
is, costly expenditure that acts as an index of hidden assets, like social net-
work size, in the case of an individual, or ability to mount collective actions,
in the case of a group. In addition to quality, signals have other properties.
Like the Olympian games, they may occur intermittently, showcasing a sig-
naler’s strength and adeptness. Or, like religious festivals, they may be
7 In archaeology, other applications of this thinking have followed. See McGuire and Hilde-
brandt (2005) and Plourde (2008) for application to prehistoric hunter-gatherers; Glatz and
Plourde (2011) use Costly Signaling Theory in their analysis of Hittite frontier stelea. Else-
where, i (Wandsnider 2013) have used this approach to look at public benefactions in Roman
Western Rough Cilicia.
8 Summary in Higham 2014.
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broadcast annually, allowing families to reassert their claims to status.9 Or,
like fortification walls, they may be broadcasting continuously.10 Signals may
be transmitted over short distances, requiring person-to-person interaction,11
carry well within the community (as within the amphitheater, see Gleason’s
[2006] and van Nijf ’s [1997] discussion of social interactions in the amphithe-
ater), or travel well over large distances as seen for the almost monumental
circuit wall at Heraklea under Latmos.12 Other aspects of material signals are
presented in the section that follows.
Finally, as already alluded to above, signals may be emitted by individuals
or by groups. To date, most of the costly signaling literature has focused on sig-
naling by either individuals to other individuals or between groups, such as
kin groups. In a critical recent treatment, however, Paul Roscoe (2009) offers
a compelling analysis of what he terms social signaling that links signaling at
the individual and group levels. His analysis mines ethnographic accounts for
contact-era New Guinea, where the competition for territory and organization
of defense rivals that described for Hellenistic Anatolia.13 Individuals signal
their capacities within social groups through ritualized competitions that put
on display the qualities—stamina, courage, strength, mental agility—needed
for successful competition at the group level. All contestants survive the con-
test and live to fight for the group another day. And individuals and families
accordingly decide whom to support.
At the group level Roscoe recognizes social signaling in three forms: conspic-
uous distributions (lavish feasts), conspicuous performances by well-choreo-
graphed, intricately costumed performers, and conspicuous constructions
(gigantic clan cult houses). Importantly, in both performances and themassive
cult houses, the contributions of the individual are masked. All three media,
however—material, performance, and architecture—communicate honest
signals of the number of kin and allies supporting collective projects, the abil-
ities of contributing individuals, and the fact that individuals are willing to
bend their interests to a larger communal effort. That is, they are an index
of collective action.14 In this manner, individual clans composing a village
9 Boone 1998.
10 Van Dyke and Alcock 2003.
11 As in daily bathing, for example; see Fagan 2002.
12 Camp 2000, 43.
13 Ma 2000.
14 Roscoe 2009, 98 also recognizes another kind of non-indexical signal that may allow for
prevarication. Some groups may be so effective in manipulating their media that through
aesthetics, they can present an image of power and danger that is not matched by actual
strength.
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communicatedwith each other and villages communicatedwith other villages,
especially important for maintaining territory in contact-era New Guinea.
This multi-level aspect of costly or social signaling is not insignificant. It
helps resolve a paradox of social living that has long been recognized and
commented upon by thinkers as diverse as Plato (The Republic), Aristotle (The
Politics),15 Ibn Khaldun (1958), and Charles Darwin (1922). That is, in a group of
individuals with no other constraints, the selfish individual will outcompete
the individual who thinks of others, that is, the altruist or, more aptly, the
solidarist. But, in a world consisting of other groups competing for territory or
other scarce resources, the group composed of solidarists (who are rewarded
for their solidarity) will outcompete the group composed of selfish individuals.
Several points are critical here. Signaling between individuals occurs in
a group that includes multiple signalers and also many receivers. Similarly,
signalingbetweengroups onlymatters if there are groups jockeying for position
with a region of groups. That is, signaling is always a multi-level phenomenon.
Second, signaling theory helps us to understand the individual-group-region
dynamic. It helps us understand how competent individuals and groups are
identified. Most importantly, it helps us understand the existence of large
groups of unrelated but prosocial individuals, which challenges the conclusion
reached throughkin selection thinking16—thatwehelp thepeople towhomwe
are related and, in so doing, help ourselves.17 On a competitive stage (and all of
the world is such a stage), groups composed of solidarist individuals prevail.18
Public Architecture as Costly Signals
As mentioned above, social signals have various properties and here I focus
expressly on public architecture as a material signal. More specifically, I sug-
gest that public architecture seen in urban Hellenistic Anatolia and Roman
Asia Minor, constructed through individual munificence as well as with city
revenues, may usefully be viewed as a conjoined costly signal, emitted by both
individuals, i.e., citizens, and the group, i.e., the polis or city.19
15 See Simpson 1997.
16 See Trivers 1971.
17 Much ink has been spilled on this issue in evolutionary biology. See Bowles and Gintis
2003, Boyd and Richerson 1992, Gintis et al. 2001, Heinrich 2006, Richerson et al. 2003, and
Smith 2003.
18 O’Gorman et al. 2008; Wilson andWilson 2008.
19 So, as Alcock (2002, 19) notes, architectural materials already reported by archaeologists
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Certainly others have appreciated the signaling capacity of architecture, as
Smith (2011) reviews. Bruce Trigger (1990), for example, focuses on monumen-
tal architecture, defined as those structures that exceed in scale and degree of
elaboration that required by their functional role. He sees monumental archi-
tecture as a symbol of power, in that it is an egregious “expense of energy,
especially in the form of other people’s labour, in non-utilitarian ways.”20 For
him, the larger ormore elaborate the structure, the greater the display of power,
althoughMarcus (2003) cautions against taking this generalization as law. Trig-
ger and also Abrams (1989) note that public architecture is particularly potent
in conveying messages to linguistically and ethnically diverse groups, such as
those commonly making up the populace of early and later states, and, as in
the case here, Greek (and Greco-Roman) cities from the late Hellenistic period
onward.
Several researchers21 have observed that public architecture seems often
to have been constructed in stressful (but not catastrophic) times, such as in
the initial phase of a new social, political, or economic formation. Abrams
interprets this pattern in terms of the deliberate formation of a group iden-
tity; a signaling interpretation emphasizes that individuals, sub-groups, and
groups are asserting not only identity so as to differentiate “us” from “them,”
but, as importantly, materially signaling their competence and capability to
attract and maintain continuing support. And commenting on public archi-
tecture in the Valley of Oaxaca, archaeologist Richard Blanton notes: “As com-
munications media, monumental architecture is actually relatively efficient.
The initial costs of construction may be great, but once built a massive build-
ing or plaza can be seen by thousands of people over great lengths of time,
broadcasting continuously for even thousands of years.”22 Elsewhere, Blan-
ton (1994) recognizes different kinds of communication or signals: indexi-
cal, to indicate relative status (communicating with peers), and canonical, to
indicate participation in a broader cultural tradition (a supra-ordinate audi-
ence).
Architecture as a signal is specifically referenced in the literature on costly
and social signaling. Neiman (1997) argues that potential lords incurred per-
sonal costs in the construction of pyramids and stelea, which informs non-kin
and others become the grist for various interpretative efforts. Where Alcock emphasizes
assertions of social memory through architecture, I shift focus to a more general commu-
nicative aspect of public architecture.
20 Trigger 1990, 125.
21 Abrams 1989; Childe 1945.
22 Blanton 1989, 413.
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especially on their leadership qualities. Where for Neiman buildings are used
as indices of personal abilities, Roscoe (2009) sees them, in the case of the cult
houses constructed by southern lowland New Guinea clan groups, as a means
for indexing effective collective action, wherein actions of individuals are sub-
limated to the group cause.
It seems potentially useful, then, to consider public architecture as a signal,
but important questions remain: who is the signaler? whom is being signaled?
is the public architecture signal indeed a costly signal? what message is being
conveyed?Toanswer thesequestions for theGreek cities ofHellenisticAnatolia
and the Greco-Roman cities of Roman Asia Minor, I rely on several recent
treatments of civic benefactions as known through epigraphic inscriptions.
Public Architecture as an Individual Costly Signal
In the case of the Greek cities of Anatolia during the Hellenistic era, public
buildings were one of several kinds of civic benefaction made by the dynasts
and Successor kings vying for control of territory and tribute in the power
vacuum left by Alexander.23 As wealth increased during the later Hellenis-
tic period, wealthy citizens replaced dynasts and would-be dynasts as the
civic benefactors. In a recent thesis on aedilitian24 euergetism for Hellenis-
tic western Anatolia, Marest-Caffey (2008) notes the transition from short
acknowledgements of civic benefactions to, in the late Hellenistic era, lengthy
detailed accounts of the grooming and benefaction histories of individuals
from wealthy families. These polis notables, we learn, underwrote city deficits,
ensured the availability of grain in times of scarcity, built or repaired city build-
ings, and headed up diplomatic missions to other cities, local dynasts, or the
Roman Senate itself.25 In some cases, the wealthy notables assumed various
city offices or magistracies, which were at this time undergoing a transition
from democratically elected offices to offices bought and held for life by the
wealthy.26
The perspective emphasized in the literature on euergetism or public bene-
faction is that of individuals performing and having acknowledged in inscrip-
tions their virtuous qualities.27 The costly signaling perspective would regard
23 Veyne 1976.
24 Following European scholarship, Marest-Caffey (2008, 10) distinguishes aedilitian euer-
getism as that involving benefactors who restored, repaired, embellished, and erected
public buildings, among the most costly and visible of benefactions.
25 Gauthier 1985; Migeotte 1997.
26 Dmitriev 2005; Quaß 1993.
27 Gauthier 1985; Migeotte 1997; Veyne 1976; Zuiderhoek 2009.
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these acts as signals with a larger purpose. That is, these acts convey infor-
mation about individual qualities that assists others in making good deci-
sions about potential leaders and allies. What might some of these qualities
have been? One might be effectiveness as a member of the many diplomatic
embassies sent first to the Successor kings and local dynasts as well as to other
cities,28 potential Roman patrons,29 to the Roman Senate and still later to the
Roman governors and emperors.30 That is, an individual who is able to nego-
tiate with various forces and factions within the city for the placement of a
building or the organization of a festival likely also possesses the oratorical and
persuasive skills to be effective in Rome. A second quality conveyed is that of
being able to organize and finance the religious festivals thatwere the life of the
Anatolian city.31 Again, the individual citizen is communicating in deed their
prosocial orientation as well as their financial ability. A final quality might be
that of being able and inclined to pay ransom for kidnapped citizens, especially
when pirates and brigands were active, as they were during the late Hellenistic
period in the Mediterranean.32
Where for the later Hellenistic Period individuals may be seen as signaling
their prosocial orientation to the demos and the oligarchs, in Imperial times
wealthy citizens appear to be signaling other oligarchs for entrance into the
ranks of the bouleutic order (à la Veblen’s analysis of the nouveau riche in
the late-nineteenth-century United States). In a recentmasterful treatment for
RomanAsiaMinorArjan Zuiderhoek examines the institution of civic benefac-
tions using a database compiled from inscriptions acknowledging more than
500 acts, including constructing whole or portions of public buildings, under-
writing the distribution of food, and sponsoring religious festivals and games.
By this time, AsiaMinor citieswere governed by an oligarchy,with elite families
dominating the council and other political offices.33 As well, the composition
of council was likely very dynamic, owing to simple demographic factors.34
City councils, composed of hundreds of people, undoubtedly lost many people
each year through natural causes. Who should replace them? In this situation,
Zuiderhoek contends that the benefactions of the potential office-holderswere
used by the elites in power to identify whom to grant entrance.
28 Ma 2003.
29 Ferrary 1997.
30 Mitchell 1993; Price 1984.
31 Billows 2003; Gleason 2006; Millar 1993.
32 E.g., Teos, seg 44:949; de Souza 2000; Gabrielsen 2003; Rauh 2003.
33 Burrell 2004; Dmitriev 2005.
34 Zuiderhoek 2009, 133.
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Public Architecture as a Group Costly Signal
In addition to being viewed as an individual signal, public architecture is
also usefully seen as a signal emitted by “the city.” The polis assembly and
council, usually in tandem, are making decisions about the location, nature,
and scale of public building.35 While the benefactions of wealthy individuals
are responsible for some of these buildings, recent scholarship36 emphasizes
that city institutions also called upon revenues from rent, liturgies, and indirect
taxes to finance public building. And, importantly, the city may have solicited
subscriptions from citizens and others (women and foreigners, for example)
to finance the construction of large buildings.37 This latter is important for
it conveys that individuals, either under duress or willingly, sublimated their
individual effort to a communal effort.
The messages and audiences for the city signal are several. City residents,
both citizens and non-citizens, are receiving messages about the differential
power of different city and, later, imperial institutions. Hansen and Fischer-
Hansen (1994), writing on Greek cities in Greece, note the changes in monu-
mentality that occur over time, with monumental palaces and temples seen
in Archaic and Classical times, and, by the Hellenistic period, monumental
bouleuteria and prytaneia, i.e., monumental buildings associated with repub-
lican institutions. The presence, location, and scale of solidaristic public archi-
tecture—agoras, baths, gymnasiums, bouleuteria, odea, and theaters—com-
municate to citizens and potential citizens the solidarist orientation of the
city; such messages may be especially important to the recruitment efforts of
cities during the Late Hellenistic period when geographic mobility seems to
have been quite high.38 Into the Imperial period, triumphal arches, statues and
temples to the Imperial cult, as well asmassive bathing complexes fed by aque-
ducts, signaled the presence and influence of emperor and, as importantly, the
city’s acknowledgement of the emperor.39 And, at least at Sagalassos, “[t]he
open agoras and fora became enclosed,monumentalized spaceswere designed
to exclude rather than include and were dominated by buildings geared to
35 Raja 2003. The revisedunderstanding of the council-assembly relationship sees the assem-
bly, while perhaps with diminished power compared to earlier times, as more than a
rubber stamp for council decisions and actions, even into the Imperial period. See Gau-
thier (1985), van Nijf (1997), and Zuiderhoek (2008).
36 Migeotte 1995; Reger 2003; Schwartz 2001; Zuiderhoek 2009.
37 Migeotte 1992, 1997.
38 Pomeroy 1997, 108.
39 Burrell 2004, 359–371; Mitchell 1993, 80; Price 1984.
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elite activity,” as the oligarchic order was established and reified in architec-
ture.40
Certainly, the residents of cities are paying attention to the cityscape, both
form and upkeep, of potential polis allies (for the Hellenistic period) and com-
petitors (for the Imperial period).41 It is clear that at least in some instances,
outside observers anddecision-makers, such as agents of the Empire, paid care-
ful attention to the constructions found in cities when deciding which city was
worthy of being awarded the title of “neokoros.”42 It remains to be established
how the potential Successor kings of the Hellenistic era, pirates and brigands,
and wealthy Roman patrons regarded and reacted to cityscapes of differently
arrayed public splendor.
Indeed, the public architecture of the Hellenistic Anatolia and Roman Asia
Minor appears to be a textbook example of what Bliege Bird and Smith43 refer
to as “piggybacking,”with costly signals of the city being deliberately assembled
from the costly signals of individual citizens to the benefit of both. The citizen
benefactor contributed (monumental) public buildings to the city, enhancing
the signal emitted by the city. At the same time, the citizen is also rewarded by
the polis in being named a euergetēs, with other difficult-to-assess rewards—
access to the civic machinery or important social connections—presumably
following. And, of course, the individual and his or her family benefits by virtue
of being part of a successful communal unit, such as a city named first city, or to
which the governor brings his assize, or that is excused from paying tribute.44
Were Public Buildings “Costly Signals?” Do They Index Abilities?
Public buildings constructed in Hellenistic and Roman times were certainly
expensive.45 Do they in fact constitute an honest, costly signal, emitted by
either the citizen or the city? That is, can they serve as a reliable index of
collective action?
40 Waelkens 2002, 66.
41 “One could hold one’s head up higher visiting another city if one’s native city were known
for its fine public buildings; it was painful to blush for ramshackle shops and dilapidated
bathhouses when the governor came to towns” (Dio Chrysostom 40.9; translation in
Gleason 2006, 231).
42 Summary in Burrell 2004, 355–356.
43 Bliege Bird and Smith 2005, 235.
44 Millar 1993.
45 Duncan-Jones 1990, 177 gives the cost of a single medium-sized temple in North Africa in
the second century ad as 60,000–70,000 sesterces, which equates, using figures given by
Zuiderhoek 2009, 25, to the annual subsistence for some 500 people.
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Focusing on the individual level first, interpretation is mixed. On one hand,
Zuiderhoek (2005, 2009) emphasizes for Roman Asia Minor, first, that cities
are being outfitted not solely through individual beneficence, but also, and
possibly even primarily, through the deployment of city resources coming
from indirect taxes and liturgies. Second, using estimates of productivity and
income, he argues that at most, on average, 5% or less of the annual aggregate
elite income was devoted to public building.46 But, it must be emphasized
that Zuiderhoek is here talking about averages and aggregates. As Neiman
(1997) emphasizes, it is in actual competitive matchups where signal quality
is assessed; one need be perceptibly better then one’s closest rival to win the
contest at hand.
On the other hand, it is clear that only the very wealthy could afford tomake
benefactions of entire buildings. Certainly, such benefactions seem to be very
rare47 and they often were made by the same individual or family. This pattern
is seen in Marest-Caffey’s (2008) work on benefactions for late Hellenistic
Anatolia,Duncan-Jones’ (1990) comparative analysis of Thugga andThamugadi
inRomanNorthAfrica, andZuiderhoek’s (2005, 2009) sample of 44 inscriptions
from his larger database, focusing on second-through-third-century Imperial
western Asia Minor (primarily Lycia).
For Asia Minor during the high Imperial period, Zuiderhoek48 reports that,
excluding gifts of entire buildings, 60% of the public benefactions attested to
by inscription in his database are “small,” 1000 denarii or less. By Zuiderhoek’s
reckoning (2005, 2009), 1000 denarii represents 80% of the annual income that
would come from rent on land valued at 25,000 denarii, the minimum wealth
requirement for a citizen seeking a position as a councilor. Thus, even these
“small” benefactions are being made by a class of families wemight call almost
wealthy or peri-wealthy.
All the same, evenwith this informationwe do not have contextual informa-
tion to know how wealthy the peri-wealthy are and if in fact a particular bene-
faction constitutes a real cost to them and their families. It would be useful, for
example, tohave a completedistributionof benefaction sumsandcompare this
distributionwith distributions ofwealth as attested to bymortuary or domestic
materials. If our signaling hypothesis holds water, then we would expect to see
an exaggerated mode of benefactions for the almost wealthy and peri-wealthy,
those striving to establish their status in a dynamic social structure.
46 Zuiderhoek 2009, 35.
47 Migeotte 1997.
48 2009, 29.
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Other textual evidence exists, however. For Classical Greece49 we know
strategies existed whereby wealthy individuals would attempt to shift their
imposed liturgies to another and the same is documented for the Roman
period.50 For the Imperial period, we know that civic obligations might ruin
a family and had to be managed very carefully,51 suggesting that real costs are
being incurred by at least some of the wealthy. And, finally, sumptuary laws
were enacted during the period 100bc to ad 50 to rein in the incredible displays
of wealth being made by individuals. One interpretation of these laws is that
they provided cover so that aristocrats could avoid bankruptcy.52
On balance, then, it seems as though public buildings and the adornments
and embellishments also donated, with benefactors’ names advertised, do
indeed represent a costly display by individuals and families. But, moving now
to the group level, does the public architecture of the polis represent a costly
group signal? Echoing Roscoe (2009) regarding NewGuinea villages at contact,
failure to compose a strong group signal that reflects effective collective action
is to invite disaster within the hyper-competitive arenas of either Hellenistic
peer polities53 or the Imperial world in which first citizens, first cities, and first
provinces were recognized and rewarded.54
Textual evidence shows that cities could to be accused of engaging in build-
ing viewed as too costly. Thus, that too much wealth was being devoted to the
construction of a monumental cityscape became of concern during the high
Imperial period. “[Public buildings] had to be restricted, in the interests of pre-
ventingwasteful expenditure and unhealthy inter-city rivalry.”55 If city building
plans were deemed too grand, Rome might send a corrector or auditor to reor-
ganize city finances.56
Citizen and City Costly Signaling
In the preceding paragraphs, I have attempted to make the case that the pub-
lic architecture of the polis can be viewed as the costly signals of individuals
49 Carmichael 1997; Veyne 1976.
50 Gleason 2006; Price 1984.
51 Price 1984; Veyne 1976; Zuiderhoek 2009.
52 Parkins 1997, 90–91; Zanker 1990, 25.
53 Ma 2000, 2003.
54 For “neokoroi” see Burrell 2004; Price 1984.
55 Mitchell 1993, 81.
56 Burrell 2004; Gleason 2006, 246.
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upon which are piggybacked the costly signal being constructed by city. The
individual signals allow for decisions about whom to admit to the council or to
hold city offices (at least for males), with decisions made at first by the demos
(in Hellenistic times) and then later by the oligarchy (in Imperial times and
possibly earlier). Those office holders often had the multi-faceted responsibil-
ity for negotiating the place of the city (and its citizens) in the complex and
competitive world of the easternMediterranean. The cityscape itself—the sets
of buildings, their location, and their ornateness—provides an overall index of
collective action. Moreover, the manifestations of city institutions in the form
of monumental stone within the cityscape sends a signal about city values and
power structures to residents and visitors, citizens and non-citizens, thatmight
be effective in repelling foes and recruiting newmembers.
From the above, we might expect material signals to become especially
important as city size increases and as city populations includemore foreigners
who transact socialmatters usingmore than one language. Such signals should
also be important when stressful conditions prevail, creating opportunities for
signalers, both individuals and groups, to display both their prosocial orienta-
tion and their effectiveness. The Hellenistic period for western Anatolia and
early Imperial Asia Minor saw exactly these conditions.
Citizen and City Signaling in Late Hellenistic Anatolia
The Hellenistic period of the eastern Mediterranean was, as Ma notes, the
“age of the city-states [or] poleis … of kings … and of elephants, gigantic war-
ships, imperial processions, and stupendous feasting and drinking.”57 During
this time Greek city culture expanded both within the greater Mediterranean
basin and also to the east and beyond through colonization and other means.
Whereas the hundreds of colonies established during the heyday of early Greek
colonization (750–550bc) had been confined to coastal areas around theMedi-
terranean and Black Sea, during the Hellenistic period new cities (perhaps as
many as 150) appeared in the wake of Alexander throughout Anatolia, Syria,
Palestine, andMesopotamia.58 These cities likely represented previously exist-
ing cities that now included a Greek population, a new Greek name and, criti-
cally, Greek civic institutions.59 Simultaneously, some non-Greek cities in Ana-
tolia, e.g., Alabanda, came to adopt Greek political language and civic appara-
tus.60
57 Ma 2003, 13.
58 Billows 2003; Cohen 1995.
59 Billows 2003, 198.
60 Ma 2003, 25–26, 38.
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During the early Hellenistic period (fourth and third centuries bc), the loca-
tion of western Anatolia, at distance from the centers from which the various
Successors to Alexander operated, meant that cities, depending on strategic
location and resources, variously received the welcome and unwelcome atten-
tion of multiple vying Successor kings.61 Thus, cities here were inadvertent
participants in the bigwars of the Successors for tribute but also inveterate con-
testants in the small wars fought by the cities themselves for territory.62
During the later Hellenistic period, as the influence of Alexander’s Succes-
sors waned, piracy and predation by land-based brigands increased. At this
time, then, captured citizens might be sold into slavery if not ransomed by kin
or by civic benefactors.63 A Roman presence in the area was initially limited
but, for several interrelated reasons, gradually increased during this time. In
exchange for their support, Mithridates vi of Pontus (echoing earlier tyrants)
offered Anatolian Greek cities autonomy and escape from Roman subordi-
nation. To deal with piracy as well as Mithridates and the usurper Ariston-
icus, who attempted to hold the Attalid bequest to Rome, Rome increased
its involvement in the area.64 Subsequently, the civil wars of the late Roman
Republic spilled over into western Anatolia, with Anatolian cities forced to gar-
rison and support Roman troops.
Over the course of the Hellenistic period, then, the cities of western Ana-
tolia endured stresses and strains that varied by location, intensity, and the
degree to which relief could be sought via an embassy. While interpretation
of population levels is mixed,65 on balance it seems reasonable to postulate an
increase in population for western Anatolian cities, in spite of these stresses.
Assuming Classic era Anatolian cities were similar in size to those in Greece,
cities may have been the residence for 1,000–2,000 (more rarely 5,000–10,000)
inhabitants.66 In the later Hellenistic era, population is estimated at 2,600–
3,000 (e.g., Priene) with some cities (Ephesus, Smyrna) approaching or exceed-
ing 100,000.67 Individual wealth also increased.68 Finally, we see in Hellenis-
tic times an increase in the proportion of foreigners—Greek and non-Greek,
61 Gauthier 1993; Ma 2003; Millar 1993.
62 Chaniotis 2005; Ma 2000.
63 De Souza 2000; Gabrielsen 2003.
64 Sherwin-White 1977.
65 See Reger 2003 334–335 for summary.
66 Hansen 2000.
67 Billows 2003, 201.
68 Rostovtzeff 1941. And, extending Zuiderhoek’s (2009 53–60) neo-Ricardian analysis into
the late Hellenistic era, limited agricultural land along with an increasing population
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figure 3.1 Thirty Accounts of Aedilitian Public Benefactions Compiled by Marest-Caffey (2008)
for Late Hellenistic Anatolia. Note that time periods are unequal and benefaction
frequencies have not been standardized by number of years in each time period.
transient and resident, later including Romans—in Greek cities.69 All of these
aspects are important because they are precisely the conditions in which an
expensive multi-lingual material signal, such as a monumental public build-
ing, might bemost effective in conveying individual prosocial talent and group
competence.
The records of building benefactions compiled by Marest-Caffey (2008) for
western Anatolian cities allow for a preliminary examination of this thesis.70
meant that land, owned by thewealthy, became evenmore valuable, allowing thewealthy
even more surplus to be used for display purposes.
69 Chamoux 2003, 197–200; Mitchell 2000.
70 Marest-Caffey’s thesis explores the content and context for epigraphic inscriptions men-
tioning building benefactions, usually portions of buildings, by very wealthy members of
the cities, including women, of western Anatolia. She works with inscriptions describing
thirty benefactions that range in age from before the second century bc until just prior to
the Roman Imperial period.
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This evaluation is limited by the fact that the inscriptions are drawn from a
restricted time period (especially themiddle to late Hellenistic period) and the
total number is quite small. Nevertheless, Figure 3.1 shows trends consistent
with the expectations given above. That is, during the late second century bc,
precisely when cities are in need of citizens to lead embassies to other cities
or to the Roman Senate to argue for leniency, civic benefactions involving
public buildings peak. For example, Marest-Caffey (2008) reviews the record
of the career of Menippos of Kolophon. He engaged in many acts of civic
beneficence, included providing money for the construction of the doorframe
for the pronaos of the temple to Apollo (Claros 64–65, col. ii, ll. 24–33) and
paying for the quartering of the governor Quintus Mucius Scaevola and his
troops at Kolophon (Claros 65, col. ii, ll. 42–46). Of note here, Menippos was
sent to the Roman Senate on five occasions to speak on behalf of Kolophon.
And, the decrees also indicate that benefactors like Menippos often held some
sort of city office, sometimes quite prestigious. For example, Menippos was
twice elected as strategos (general; Claros 64, col. ii, ll. 7–18), held the office
of prytanis (the eponymous office of Kolophon) and served as agonothetēs
(superintendent of sacred games; Claros 65, col. ii, ll. 33–44).
Marest-Caffey’s compilation also allows for analysis of architectural signals
withmultiple audiences.71 That is, we can dimly see the political or social mes-
sages being conveyed by the erectors of particular architecture, as exemplified
by Hansen and Fischer-Hansen’s (1994) interpretation of the changes seen in
monumental architecture over time.As Figure 3.1 shows, fortifications aremen-
tioned in honorific decrees early on, when intercity warfare and negotiation
were elevated; gymnasia and baths later on, as new citizens and Roman spon-
sors were recruited. Temples, critical to the definition of a unique city iden-
tity, feature prominently during the second century and the late second cen-
tury. Bouleuterion and prytaneion construction and repair, i.e., work on public
buildings associated with increasingly oligarchic but nevertheless republican
institutions of the council andmagistracies, was acknowledged in the later sec-
ond century, as various pressures (indirect Roman Republican presence and
resistance to that presence, piracy) were felt by the cities.
In sum, this latter time period was especially stressful for cities and, thus,
opportunities for acts of solidaristic civic benefaction abounded. Second, there
existed various stable targets for embassies from the cities to seek relief, includ-
ing other cities and the Roman Senate. Given this situation, ameans for identi-
fying (and rewarding) individuals with diplomatic skills, charisma, a prosocial
71 I.e., à la Rapaport’s 1990 architectural communication theory; see also Smith 2011.
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orientation andother resources thatmight lead to a successfulmissionwas crit-
ical; the behaviors usually glossed as civic benefactions, and here referred to as
social signals, served in this capacity. Third, a combination of economic factors
and simple scalar factors contributed to inter-individual competition. Wealth
appears to have increased as did city population (in spite of plagues and war-
fare). But given that polis institutions had preset restricted sizes (e.g., council
size of 100), a mechanism for sorting out the crowd at the gate, via culturally
condoned social signaling, became inevitable. Veyne’s “rise of the notables,”
who deployed public benefactions enhancing self and city, should not be seen
as an exceptional event, but, rather an expectable trend.
Citizen and City Signaling in Roman AsiaMinor
Troops, wealthy patrons, and publicans of the Roman Republic were active in
portions of western Anatolia beginning about 200bc. The Roman province of
Asia was organized in 133bc by Manius Aquillius and subsequently, but espe-
cially just before the Imperial period, Roman involvement in the area accel-
erated. Then, population centers of indigenous peoples along with resident
Greeks and Romans (especially in interior Asia Minor) were deliberately orga-
nized into communities by agents of Rome. At this time, a city government
based on a modified Greek model was installed. Towns and other units were
formally designated and made subordinate to nearby cities.72
In general, population levels increased for the circum-Mediterranean from
the Late Republic into the early and High Imperial times73 and certainly popu-
lation reorganization, through top-down and local bottom-up forces,74
occurred. For Greek and newly organized Greco-Roman cities in Asia Minor,
population estimates range from 180,000 for major cities like Pergamum (west-
ern Asia Minor) to 25,000 for few large urban centers, to 5,000–15,000 for most
communities.75
In such cities, the local indigenous language was spoken but Greek was
used in civic discourse, performance, and even by agents of Rome in their
communications with the city.76 In other words, not only are multiple kin
groups co-residing in these communities, but so too are speakers of multiple
language groups.77
72 Mitchell 1993, 176–179.
73 See Zuiderhoek 2009, 42–43 for summary.
74 See discussion by Alcock 1993.
75 Mitchell 1993, 243–244.
76 Gleason 2006, 229.
77 The definition of “individual” should also likely be adjusted. In Classical times, the “effec-
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Thepopulace of AsiaMinor benefited from its incorporation into the empire
in severalways. PaxRomana, an expandingnetworkof roads, and a consistently
applied legal system led to a general increase in circulating wealth even as
wealth disparities were magnified. Mentioned above, Zuiderhoek78 highlights
the confluence of increasing population and limited agricultural land, leading
to the relative scarcity and, hence, increased value of the latter. Thus, the
holders of agricultural land became relatively wealthier over this interval.
For the Late Hellenistic period, poor decisions by cities, for example, to
support Aristonicus or Mithridates, led to significant sanctions imposed by
the victorious Romans. Also, piracy and brigandage meant that citizens were
exposed to real personal threats.While actual peril to citizens and cities of Asia
Minor diminished in the Imperial period, this does not mean that competition
ceased. Rather, it assumed new forms with different dynamics.
At the individual level, the competition for reputation that occurred among
elite individuals and families of Asia Minor soared to new heights.79 Zuider-
hoek’s (2009) recent analysis of civic benefactions testified to in inscriptions
for AsiaMinor shows amajor peak for the second century ad falling off into the
third and fourth centuries. Zuiderhoek reviews and critiques the various rea-
sons given for this increase, and he finds them all wanting. He argues, instead,
that these acts of civic benefaction, which, importantly, are acknowledged in
stone by city institutions, are acts of legitimation both on the part of the bene-
factor elite citizen and the citizen recipient. Tomaintain the stability and inter-
nal cohesion of the city when new levels of wealth inequality had developed,
tomask the decline in the power of the democratic assemblies (by which cities
still presented themselves to the world, as seen in inscriptions) and to natural-
ize the ongoing ideological transition from that of Classical isonomia (equality
of rights for all) to the extant hierarchical order, this mechanism was critical
and, hence, prolifically enacted, he argues.80
But Zuiderhoek81 also offers another explanation, to which I have alluded
to above. That is, these acts of civic benefaction may also be seen as signals
to the members of the new, exclusive, and dynamic bouleutic order. They are
tive individual” was a citizen of a specific polis. Citizenship was limited to males. By Late
Hellenistic times, females, foreigners, and freed slaves, in addition to male citizens, are
operating as “effective individuals,” (Pomeroy 1997) further exacerbating the scalar effects
described herein.
78 2009, 53–60.
79 Gleason 2006; Price 1984; Veyne 1976; Zuiderhoek 2009.
80 See also Gleason 2006.
81 2009, 133.
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demonstrations of the prosocial competency of individuals (and their families)
to operate in this order.82
Zuiderhoek offers proximate explanations. Ultimately, this inter-individual
competition may have been driven by the same factors mentioned for the
Hellenistic case: opportunity for signaling, simple scalar issues, and available
wealth. Envoys dispatched by the cities to theGovernor or to Romewere instru-
mental in securing privileges as well as the commitment from the emperor
to provide the splendid set of public buildings to which contemporary writers
frequently refer.83 According to my argument, costly signaling, i.e., civic bene-
factions, by individuals, would help identify those individuals best able to take
the city’s case to theGovernor. In termsof scale, take two cities—one small, one
large, both with the same civic institutions—the opportunities for individual
access to those institutions will be more limited in the case of the city with a
larger body of citizens. Newly available wealth exacerbated this situation, lead-
ing to magnificent ostentatious displays in monumental architecture.
For the newly founded and refounded cities of Lycia, however, the storymay
be different. Given the complex history of Lycia, especially interior Lycia,84
the Classic Greek ideology of isonomiamay have been less significant. In addi-
tion to the factorsmentioned above, communicating their status, i.e., indexical
signaling, and their commitment to the new Roman order, i.e., canonical sig-
naling, may have been even more important to the members of the new urban
elite.
On the level of cities operating in competitive provinces, indexical signal-
ing by city institutions seems evident. By Imperial times, a city was defined in
terms of civic buildings (rather than the autonomy valued by earlier Classic and
evenHellenistic cities;Mitchell 1993, 80). Citiesmade proposals to the emperor
to initiate a cult in his name and/or build a temple to him. Funds for the tem-
ple and culture came from the emperor, the city, the province, or local wealthy
individuals and “provincial cities all but bankrupted themselves (and some-
times did) in competition with each other.”85 Imperial cult temples became
82 Here it would be useful to be able to better resolve sequence and also follow the careers of
the “also rans.” Are public benefactions being made especially in the early portion of the
careers of the notables, that is, before they have been elected to the boule? Inscriptions
acknowledge successful transactions between individual and city institutions; we are
ignorant about those who attempted to join the ranks of the bouleutic order but were
not successful.
83 Burrell 2004, 331–334.
84 Colvin 2004; Keen 1998; Ten Cate 1965.
85 Ratté 2001 123.
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the sites of cult festivities attended by representatives from cities throughout
the province and alsowerewhere honorific statues of local dignitarieswere put
up.86 Cities making (and being granted) such requests also put themselves on
the map in terms of being considered for the site of an assize, or to the claim
of First City, for which competition was fierce, and Rome was adept at playing
cities off against each other.87
But canonical signaling, that the city is part of the new Imperial world
order, is also evident. Notes Millar: “It is not too much to say that the public
self-expression of the ‘Greek-city’ in the Empire embodied at every level an
explicit recognition of the distant presence of the Emperor.”88 And, writes
Ratté:
At Aphrodisias, as elsewhere, these monuments served paradoxically
both to advertise through status and inscriptions the generosity of their
individual donors, and to clothe the city in that homogenous ‘interna-
tional style’, instantly recognizable at archaeological sites throughout
Turkey and to a lesser degree throughout the eastern Mediterranean
world.89
That the materiality of the citizen and city signal was important, especially
in the earlier part of the period,90 is supported by epigraphic data on civic
benefactions compiled by Zuiderhoek. Zuiderhoek reports that for 399 inscrip-
tions from Imperial Asia Minor, 58% of these acknowledge benefactors for
contributing to public buildings, while distributions of food and oil are named
in 17% and 13% refer to games and festivals.91 (“Miscellaneous” comprises the
remaining 12%). He offers a longitudinal depiction for each of these classes of
benefactions,92 which, using figures in his Figure 5.1,93 I have recalculated to
present in terms of frequencies rather than percentages. Figure 3.2 shows that
public building benefactions always exceed other forms of benefaction in Asia
Minor. Benefactions in general are lower in the first and third centuries, peak-
ing in the second. In the first century public buildings comprise the bulk of
86 Price 1984 118–129.
87 See Gleason 2006.
88 1993, 246.
89 2001, 123.
90 As Abrams 1989 and Childe 1945 find.
91 2009, 77.
92 Zuiderhoek 2009, Appendix 3.
93 Zuiderhoek 2009 77.
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figure 3.2 Estimated Public Benefactions Documented in 399 Inscriptions from
Imperial Asia Minor (Zuiderhoek 2009 Appendix 3) as calculated using
Figures given in Zuiderhoek 2009, Figure 5.1.
the benefactions, 85%, while in the second and third centuries other forms of
benefactions are acknowledged; public building benefactions amount to 65%
in the second and 55% in the third centuries. Thus, while from the time of Sep-
timius Severus (ad 193) to themid-third century therewas amajor expansionof
inter-city agonistic competition (i.e., competitions in sports,music, and theatre
embedded within the framework of religious festivals),94 civic benefactions of
public buildings still remained high.
Some of that high frequency of public building civic benefaction seen in the
Imperial period, then, is owed, almost mechanistically, to the formation and
outfitting of new cities. Given the cosmopolitan and likelymulti-lingual nature
of these communities, we would expect public architecture to feature promi-
nently in signaling both community identity and also allegiance towards the
94 Mitchell 1993 198–199.
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emperor, following on observations by Childe (1945), Abrams (1989), and Trig-
ger (1990) on the effectiveness of architecture as a trans-lingual communication
device. Analysis of epigraphic evidence95 at the macro-scale, and more micro-
scale analyses, like that described by van Nijf (2011), are well poised to explore
this matter further.
Signaling and Polis Viability
Signaling theory may help us to appreciate differential city endurance and
growth as well as the post-disaster fate of a polis. That is, do poleis for which
we can demonstrate early and/or continuing investments in public architec-
ture (signaling coherent and effective collective action) persist better than
those poleis without such architecture? Do cities rich in dynamic and well-
maintained public architecture grow faster than their sister cities?
Cities in Anatolia and Asia Minor were subject to many different kinds of
assaults, both internal and external. During Hellenistic times, for example,
cities were often divided by factionalism, with some factions supporting Aris-
tonicus or Mithridates in their local efforts to assert claims to territory and
tribute and other factions supporting the Roman responders.96 In Imperial
times, cities that did not maintain harmonious social relations across lines
of privilege courted Roman scrutiny and the presence of troops;97 the strife
ensuing when Paul spoke in Ephesus was to be avoided. In addition to the
threat of exorbitant tribute requirements or predationbypublicans andpirates,
external threats included earthquakes, small and large, which rocked this part
of the world on an almost routine basis,98 as well plague, crop failure, and
pests.
Some cities survived these disasters, others did not.99 Cities were enmeshed
in a network of social and kin relations.100 On what basis did kin and friends
assist threatened cities? Did assistance come no matter what or was it prefer-
entially lent to those groups that had demonstrated prosocial behaviors? Was
survivorshiporpersistence correlatedwith thepresenceornumberof prosocial
actors, i.e., civic benefactors, as manifested in donations of public architecture
to the city? When Rhodes was devastated by earthquakes in 228/227bc, help
95 E.g. Zuiderhoek 2009.
96 Marest-Caffey 2008.
97 Gleason 2006; van Nijf 1997.
98 Guidoboni et al. 1994.
99 And some cities were re-founded elsewhere following disasters, as reviewed by Mackil
2004.
100 Ma 2003; Mackil 2004; Rigsby 1996.
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was quick to come from several monarchs,101 and here the strategic situation
of Rhodes was likely instrumental. Similarly, when Ephesus, now the seat of
the Roman proconsul, was struck in ad 23, its status likely contributed to its
rebuilding.102 For other smaller cities, such as Cnidus103 and Priene,104 their
post-earthquake reconstruction histories may comment on this notion. The
rich corpus of textual, archaeological, and numismatic evidence for western
Anatolia andAsiaMinor almost uniquely allows us to entertain these questions
of differential persistence over the medium term.
Concluding Remarks
Signaling theory stipulates that particular signals convey information closely
linked to otherwise difficult-to-assess capabilities of individual and groups. At
the individual level, the construction of an acknowledged public building visi-
bly communicates something important about the capabilities of the individ-
ual: that theypossess the ability tonegotiate a complex situation, i.e., thenature
and size (and location of a building or timing of a festival) of the gift to the citi-
zens; that they have received an elite education received by many of the bene-
factors,105 especially from the later Hellenistic period onward. Presumably, the
social network available to such individuals is also critical.106 Presumably, some
elites were more interested in and excelled at complex negotiations than oth-
ers. And, presumably, these same diplomatic talents were useful when dealing
with a neighboring city or a Roman governor, although this question should be
examined empirically.
At the community level, the effectiveness of city institutions and the proso-
cial orientation of its citizens is indexed by its public buildings. That is, the
public architecture of the city materially represents the successful negotia-
tions of various polis institutions—the council, the assembly, and, in Imperial
times, collegia107—as well as the presence of wealthy individuals and families.
And, even if euergetism was responsible for a small portion of public build-
ing, that the polis is able to harness resources frommultiple disparate sources,
101 Cohen 1995, 25.
102 Scherrer 2001.
103 Altunel et al. 2003.
104 Altunel 1998.
105 Watts 2006.
106 Zuiderhoek 2008.
107 van Nijf 1997.
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including subscriptions, is further testament to its proficiency in collective
action. Presumably, cities with dysfunctional institutions or more selfish citi-
zens were more poorly outfitted than cities with institutional accord. Again,
this is an empirical question that the record from Anatolia/Asia Minor is well
suited to address.
The cities of western Anatolia and Asia Minor were the fora within which
complex social, economic, and political transactions and negotiations oc-
curred. Citizens and cities were not merely “fighting over a shadow.” Rather,
these “fights” had consequences for individual citizens and their progeny and
also for individual cities. Here, I have focused onone class of these transactions,
public benefactions and public architecture, and, deploying signaling theory,
have characterized them as social signals. Moreover, I have emphasized the
materiality of signals, arguing that the city, more specifically, public buildings
or the city fabric, was also the medium (although, likely not the sole medium)
employed in these transactions. This approach lays a foundation for future
work exploring the differential success of citizens and cities.
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